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OPINION OF THE COURT 
_______________ 
 
BIBAS, Circuit Judge. 
When schools use their expertise to address each child’s 
distinct educational needs, we must give their judgments ap-
propriate deference. Endrew F. ex rel. Joseph F. v. Douglas 
Cty. Sch. Dist. RE-1, 137 S. Ct. 988, 1001-02 (2017). The In-
dividuals with Disabilities Education Act (IDEA) “requires an 
educational program reasonably calculated to enable a child to 
make progress appropriate in light of the child’s circum-
stances.” Id. at 1001. But we may not “substitute [our] own 
notions of sound educational policy for those of the school au-
thorities which [we] review.” Id. (internal quotation marks 
omitted). Our precedents already accord with the Supreme 
Court’s guidance in Endrew F., so we continue to apply them. 
Under both Endrew F. and our precedents, Downingtown Area 
School District followed the law in educating K.D. So we will 
affirm. 
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I. BACKGROUND 
A. Facts 
1. Kindergarten and testing. K.D. attended public school 
in the Downingtown Area School District from preschool 
through the first semester of third grade. Halfway through kin-
dergarten, Downingtown assigned an Instructional Support 
Team to monitor K.D.’s educational progress and give her ex-
tra support. 
After kindergarten, over the summer of 2012, K.D., her par-
ents, and her teachers completed a battery of tests. The psy-
chologist found that K.D. had a low-average IQ (87) and At-
tention Deficit Hyperactivity Disorder (ADHD). K.D. scored 
below average in early reading skills, basic reading, total read-
ing, writing, and math, and average in oral language. She could 
not read any common grade-level sight words nor the oral-
reading passages. In writing letters of the alphabet, she scored 
in the first percentile. She scored much lower than average on 
executive function, and struggled with impulsivity and organi-
zation. 
2. The first IEP. After completing these tests, Downing-
town offered K.D. an individualized education program (IEP) 
in 2012, at the start of first grade. It set measurable goals for 
letter naming, letter sounds, writing, rhyming, reading compre-
hension, math, and on-task behavior. The program’s specially 
designed instructions provided for audiobooks, extra time for 
tests and quizzes, a quiet place to take tests, and using visual 
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images and thinking aloud to promote recall of text. It also pro-
vided for three hours of learning-support instruction every 
school day. 
3. First grade. K.D. started first grade. She spent part of 
her time with the regular teacher and part with her special ed-
ucation teacher, Ms. Smith. Ms. Smith was unhappy with 
K.D.’s progress in naming and sounding out letters, so she 
changed K.D.’s homework and sent home a packet of stories 
to help her improve. Because K.D.’s visual and motor skills 
were lagging, Downingtown asked for an occupational-therapy 
screening. And to keep K.D. from regressing over the summer, 
the school changed the first IEP, arranging for three hours of 
academic support, three days per week, during July. 
4. The second IEP. The summer before second grade, in 
2013, Downingtown developed K.D.’s second IEP. It in-
creased her baselines for letter naming, letter sounds, reading 
comprehension, writing, and math calculation. Her goals for 
writing letters, rhyming, math facts, and on-task behavior re-
mained unchanged. Downingtown added “an evidence based 
multi sensory reading and writing program” for two and a half 
hours. JA 98. It retained her supplemental learning support and 
extended-school-year services. 
5. Summer before second grade. K.D.’s parents were dis-
satisfied with K.D.’s summer schooling. They asked about test-
ing K.D. for dyslexia and dysgraphia, and about the Wilson 
reading program for struggling readers. Ms. Smith replied that 
school psychologists do not diagnose those conditions, but of-
fered to put them in touch with the school psychologist any-
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way. She also said that Downingtown did not (yet) offer Wil-
son before middle school, but that K.D. would receive a similar 
program geared toward elementary-school students. 
6. Second grade and updating the second IEP. Just as K.D. 
started second grade, Downingtown switched to the Wilson 
program for kindergarteners through third graders. K.D. mas-
tered 4 of 11 units in Wilson’s Level 1 by the end of second 
grade. Downingtown also updated K.D.’s second IEP to reflect 
the results of her occupational-therapy evaluation. 
7. The third IEP. At the end of second grade, in 2014, 
Downingtown developed K.D.’s third IEP, for third grade. Re-
flecting K.D.’s progress, it increased her goals or baselines for 
letter naming, reading, writing, comprehension, and on-task 
behavior. And it kept her occupational-therapy goals and spe-
cially designed instruction.  
K.D.’s parents were dissatisfied with the new IEP, so they 
met with school officials to discuss it. They did not reject it 
after the meeting, so the IEP took effect. They also hired Ms. 
Smith to tutor K.D. over the summer, while K.D. continued in 
the school’s extended-school-year program. 
8. Dr. Kelly’s independent evaluation. In July 2014, K.D.’s 
parents hired Dr. Karen Kelly to do a neuropsychological eval-
uation. Dr. Kelly diagnosed K.D. with dyslexia, ADHD, 
“mathematics disorder, . . . organizational deficits, memory im-
pairment, [and] executive function[ ]  impairments.” JA 192. 
She also found that K.D. was reading below first-grade level. 
Beyond diagnosing K.D., Dr. Kelly criticized Downing-
town’s programming. She stated that K.D.’s poor achievement 
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showed that K.D. could not benefit from the school’s program, 
evidencing the school’s “global disregard for this level of im-
pairment.” JA 191. K.D.’s parents did not immediately notify 
Downingtown of the evaluation. 
9. Third grade and updating the third IEP. To prepare for 
third grade, Downingtown tested K.D. again. She had ad-
vanced in all aspects of reading and writing. It also tested her 
vision and found that she qualified for vision services. Two 
months after the fact, K.D.’s parents told Downingtown that 
Dr. Kelly had evaluated K.D. and that they had hired an edu-
cational advocate. 
Downingtown met with K.D.’s parents to discuss the up-
coming school year. It then performed more evaluations, added 
vision services, and offered a one-on-one aide. K.D.’s parents 
rejected the aide, for fear that it would make K.D. stand out. 
The latest IQ test showed that K.D.’s IQ had risen into the av-
erage range. 
Downingtown presented K.D.’s parents with the IEP as 
modified. They checked both the boxes for approving and for 
disapproving the IEP. They did not explain which parts they 
disliked, but expressed both hope for progress and concern 
about how appropriate her programming was. 
10. The fourth IEP and withdrawal. In the middle of third 
grade, Downingtown’s team met again. Based on their own and 
Dr. Kelly’s evaluations, as well as K.D.’s progress, Downing-
town increased her goals for writing and on-task behavior. It 
added new goals for math, reading fluency, and reading com-
prehension. It added an hour of direct math instruction, forty-
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five minutes of direct writing instruction, and fifty-five 
minutes of “multisensory reading instruction” per day, all in 
“evidence based” programs. JA 104. Downingtown also took 
Dr. Kelly’s advice to replace Wilson with “SRA/Corrective 
Reading and FastForward,” two other “research-based pro-
grams that provide phonics and reading comprehension in-
struction.” Id. 
In December 2014, midway through third grade, Downing-
town offered K.D.’s parents the new program. But they re-
jected it, withdrew K.D., and placed her in private school. 
B. Procedural History 
1. The administrative hearing. K.D.’s parents filed a com-
plaint with Pennsylvania’s Office of Dispute Resolution, seek-
ing reimbursement for private-school tuition. They argued that 
Downingtown had denied K.D. a free appropriate public edu-
cation under the IDEA. They also alleged that, by not ade-
quately addressing K.D.’s needs, Downingtown had discrimi-
nated against K.D. based on her disability, in violation of the 
Rehabilitation Act and the Americans with Disabilities Act 
(ADA). 
The administrative officer found that the IEPs were ade-
quate and that Downingtown had provided K.D. with a free ap-
propriate public education. Because the officer decided the 
case before Endrew F., he applied the Third Circuit’s mean-
ingful-benefit test. See Ridley Sch. Dist. v. M.R., 680 F.3d 260, 
268 (3d Cir. 2012) (explaining meaningful-benefit test). He 
found that Downingtown remained aware of K.D.’s slow pro-
gress and kept trying to improve her programming in response 
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to K.D.’s performance and Dr. Kelly’s report. And while it re-
peated some goals, Downingtown “did not simply hand out the 
same IEP year after year,” but repeated foundational skills 
where needed to address “the challenge of teaching even fun-
damental skills to [K.D.].” JA 115. Downingtown had ex-
plained clearly why it chose the programs it did and how they 
addressed K.D.’s needs. 
The officer disagreed with Dr. Kelly’s criticisms of Down-
ingtown. He found that Downingtown had acted reasonably in 
giving the Wilson program time to work and in pursuing occu-
pational therapy and vision services. He held that all the IEPs 
were “reasonably calculated to provide a meaningful educa-
tional benefit to [K.D.] when they were issued.” JA 116. So he 
rejected the claims based on the IDEA. The ADA and Rehabil-
itation Act claims rested on the same theory as the IDEA claim, 
so the officer rejected those claims as well. 
2. The District Court. K.D.’s parents then filed a complaint 
in District Court, bringing the same three claims. K.D. v. 
Downingtown Area Sch. Dist., No. 16-0165, 2016 WL 
4502349, at *3 (E.D. Pa. Aug. 29, 2016). They moved to sup-
plement the administrative record with new evidence, includ-
ing AIMSweb reports comparing K.D. with her peers, Down-
ingtown’s interrogatory answers, and a Wilson program 
teacher’s manual. Id. at *2-3. 
The District Court denied the motion. It reasoned that the 
ADA and Rehabilitation Act claims rested on the same grounds 
as their IDEA claim, that the new evidence was only minimally 
relevant, and that K.D.’s parents should have introduced the 
evidence before the hearing officer. Id. 
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On cross-motions for judgment on the administrative rec-
ord, the District Court granted judgment for Downingtown. 
K.D. v. Downingtown Area Sch. Dist., No. 16-0165, 2017 WL 
3838653, at *13 (E.D. Pa. Sept. 1, 2017). Because Endrew F. 
came down before it decided the case, the District Court first 
held that Endrew F. “simply confirm[ed] the standard that has 
been used in the Third Circuit for years.” Id. at *7 n.7. It went 
on to apply Endrew F. alongside our precedents, holding that 
“the IEPs contained meaningful changes” and that “in light of 
her circumstances, K.D. made appropriate and meaningful pro-
gress.” Id. at *8-9 (capitalization removed). 
The District Court had jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. §§ 1331 
and 1343. We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291.  
II. DISCUSSION 
Downingtown complied with the IDEA. It gave K.D. a free 
appropriate public education by developing tailored IEPs. And 
though K.D.’s parents claim disability discrimination under the 
ADA and Rehabilitation Act, their theory is indistinguishable 
from their IDEA claim. So all three claims fail together. 
A. Downingtown complied with the IDEA 
First, K.D.’s IDEA claim fails. K.D.’s parents argue that 
the Supreme Court, in Endrew F., implicitly overruled the 
Third Circuit’s meaningful-benefit test. And they argue that 
under Endrew F., Downingtown did not do enough with its 
IEPs to provide a free and appropriate public education. But 
Endrew F. did not overrule our precedent. And their claim fails 
under Supreme Court and Third Circuit decisions. 
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Whether Endrew F. implicitly overruled Third Circuit prec-
edent is a question of law, which we review de novo. Ridley, 
680 F.3d at 268. Whether an IEP is appropriate is a question of 
fact, which we review for clear error. Id.  
1. Endrew F. did not overrule Third Circuit precedent. In 
Endrew F., the Tenth Circuit had read the IDEA to require only 
that students make “merely . . . more than de minimis” progress. 
Endrew F. ex rel. Joseph F. v. Douglas Cty. Sch. Dist., 798 
F.3d 1329, 1338 (10th Cir. 2015) (internal quotation marks 
omitted). The Supreme Court rejected the Tenth Circuit’s 
standard, not ours. See 137 S. Ct. at 1000-01. On the contrary, 
Endrew F.’s language parallels that of our precedents. 
The Court held that the IDEA “requires an educational pro-
gram reasonably calculated to enable a child to make progress 
appropriate in light of the child’s circumstances.” Id. at 1001. 
That language mirrors our longstanding formulation: the edu-
cational program “must be reasonably calculated to enable the 
child to receive meaningful educational benefits in light of the 
student’s intellectual potential and individual abilities.” Ridley, 
680 F.3d at 269 (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). 
Our test requires an educational program “likely to produce 
progress, not regression or trivial educational advancement.” 
Id. (internal quotation marks omitted).  
Like our precedents, Endrew F. treated a child’s intellectual 
abilities and potential as among the most important circum-
stances to consider. 137 S. Ct. at 999. And we have contrasted 
our standard with that applied by the Tenth Circuit: “the provi-
sion of merely more than a trivial educational benefit does not 
meet the meaningful benefit requirement . . . .” L.E. v. Ramsey 
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Bd. of Educ., 435 F.3d 384, 390 (3d Cir. 2006) (internal quota-
tion marks omitted); see also T.R. v. Kingwood Twp. Bd. of 
Educ., 205 F.3d 572, 577 (3d Cir. 2000) (“[A] satisfactory IEP 
must provide significant learning and confer meaningful bene-
fit.” (internal quotation marks omitted)). So we see no conflict 
between Endrew F. and our precedent. 
2. K.D.’s IEPs were reasonably calculated to enable her to 
make appropriate progress. The IDEA required Downingtown 
to work with K.D.’s parents to develop IEPs that “aim[ed] to 
enable [K.D.] to make progress.” Endrew F., 137 S. Ct. at 999. 
Those aims must be “reasonably calculated” and formulated 
“in light of the child’s circumstances.” Id. Downingtown did 
so. 
Downingtown had significant foundational work to do with 
K.D. She had ADHD, vision problems, and poor motor skills. 
She was quite challenged in perceptual reasoning and pro-
cessing speed. Her reading, writing, and math skills were well 
below average. And she suffered from dyslexia and mathemat-
ics disorder. Given her impairments and circumstances, the 
District Court did not clearly err in finding that “this kind of 
fragmented progress could reasonably be expected.” 2017 WL 
3838653, at *12. 
i. IEPs must be reasonable, not ideal. Though her par-
ents argue otherwise, K.D.’s slow progress does not prove that 
her IEPs were deficient. “Any review of an IEP must appreci-
ate that the question is whether the IEP is reasonable, not 
whether the court regards it as ideal.” Endrew F., 137 S. Ct. at 
999 (emphasis in original). “The IEP must aim to enable the 
child to make progress.” Id. (emphasis added). We may not 
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rely on hindsight to second-guess an educational program that 
was reasonable at the time. 
While courts can expect fully integrated students to ad-
vance with their grades, they cannot necessarily expect the 
same of less-integrated students. As Endrew F. explained, “for 
a child fully integrated in the regular classroom, an IEP typi-
cally should . . . be reasonably calculated to enable the child to 
achieve passing marks and advance from grade to grade.” 137 
S. Ct. at 999 (internal quotation marks omitted). But the Dis-
trict Court found that K.D. was not fully integrated into the 
regular classroom. 2017 WL 3838653, at *2-3, *12. Instead, 
she received supplemental learning support for much of the 
day. So there is no reason to presume that she should advance 
at the same pace as her grade-level peers. 
Still, K.D.’s parents seek to extend the presumption beyond 
fully integrated students. They point to a regulatory guidance 
letter from the Department of Education’s Office of Special 
Education and Rehabilitative Services. It states: “Research has 
demonstrated that children with disabilities who struggle in 
reading and mathematics can successfully learn grade-level 
content and make significant academic progress when appro-
priate instruction, services, and supports are provided.” U.S. 
Dep’t of Educ., Dear Colleague Ltr., at 1 (Nov. 16, 2015). It 
also instructs that “the annual goals . . . should be sufficiently 
ambitious to help close the gap” between the child’s current 
and grade-level achievements. Id. at 5. 
K.D.’s parents overread the letter. The letter sets forth re-
search and aspirational goals, which may be helpful for some 
children. But while it aspires to “close the gap,” it does not 
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specifically require grade-level goals for children who are not 
and cannot be fully integrated into regular classrooms. It never 
mentions a presumption. Nor does it suggest that all (or even 
most) disabled children can advance at a grade-level pace. 
Even if the letter could be read as relevant, it would neither 
bind nor persuade us. Guidance letters do not enjoy Chevron 
deference. Christensen v. Harris County, 529 U.S. 576, 586-
87 (2000) (discussing Chevron U.S.A. Inc. v. NRDC, 467 U.S. 
837 (1984)). And this guidance letter does not address the 
IDEA’s language, let alone parse it. The IDEA contemplates 
educational programs tailored to “how the child’s disability af-
fects the child’s involvement and progress in the general edu-
cation curriculum.” 20 U.S.C. § 1414(d)(1)(A)(i)(I)(aa). Rather 
than presuming grade-level advancement, the Act requires re-
visions to education programs “as appropriate to address any 
lack of expected progress toward the annual goals and in the 
general education curriculum, where appropriate.” Id. 
§ 1414(d)(4)(A)(ii), (ii)(I) (emphases added).  
Because the letter neither “thorough[ly] . . . consider[s]” nor 
“valid[ly] . . . reason[s]” about the meaning of the statute, we 
find it unpersuasive on this issue. Skidmore v. Swift & Co., 323 
U.S. 134, 140 (1944). 
ii. Downingtown reviewed and revised the IEPs to keep 
them appropriately rigorous. K.D.’s slow progress does not 
prove that her IEPs were not challenging enough or updated 
enough. The hearing officer found that Downingtown did not 
simply repeat educational programs. The District Court agreed. 
The Court also rejected Dr. Kelly’s assertion that K.D. was not 
making meaningful progress. 2017 WL 3838653, at *9-12. We 
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defer to both sets of findings on appeal. See S.H. v. State-Op-
erated Sch. Dist. of the City of Newark, 336 F.3d 260, 270 (3d 
Cir. 2003) (treating the hearing officer’s factual findings as 
“prima facie correct”); Ridley, 680 F.3d at 268 (reviewing the 
District Court’s findings for clear error). 
Both the hearing officer and the District Court found that 
Downingtown was willing and able to review and revise K.D.’s 
IEPs throughout her education. After K.D.’s parents notified 
Downingtown of Dr. Kelly’s evaluation and recommendations, 
Downingtown responded within a week. It scheduled a meet-
ing, sought more assessments, and offered a one-on-one aide. 
And it developed a fourth IEP, which incorporated many of Dr. 
Kelly’s recommendations, including adopting a new reading 
program. 
Finally, K.D.’s parents advance arguments not made below. 
They claim that Downingtown did not offer K.D. an IEP for 
2015. And, at oral argument, they asserted that K.D.’s IEPs 
were not intense enough and did not strike the right balance 
between regular and special education. But “[a]bsent excep-
tional circumstances, this Court will not consider issues raised 
for the first time on appeal.” Del. Nation v. Pennsylvania, 446 
F.3d 410, 416 (3d Cir. 2006). We see no exceptional reason to 
excuse their failure. And in any event, Downingtown offered 
K.D. a fourth IEP in December 2014, which would have run 
for almost all of 2015.  
In sum, the District Court did not err in finding that Down-
ingtown set appropriately challenging goals for K.D. 
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B. No basis to supplement the record 
Nor did the District Court abuse its discretion in rejecting 
irrelevant and cumulative evidence. D.K. v. Abington Sch. 
Dist., 696 F.3d 233, 253-54 (3d Cir. 2012). Though the AIMS-
web evidence charted K.D.’s progress on school-district 
benchmarks, the administrative record already contained am-
ple evidence of how K.D. compared to her peers. Downing-
town’s interrogatory answers add no facts to what is elsewhere 
in the record. And K.D.’s parents should have introduced the 
Wilson teacher’s manual earlier, before the hearing officer. 
They gave no good reason for not doing so. 
C. No disability discrimination under the ADA or Re-
habilitation Act 
K.D.’s parents also assert disability discrimination under 
the Rehabilitation Act and ADA. They allege that Downing-
town did not use “appropriate research-based interventions” to 
“teach a student like K.D. to read.” Appellants’ Br. 45. Though 
they deny it, their allegations simply repackage those underly-
ing the IDEA claim. So the District Court properly rejected 
these claims when it rejected the IDEA claim. 
* * * * * 
K.D.’s parents understandably want only the best opportu-
nities for their daughter. But Downingtown followed the law 
by individualizing her education programs to help her make 
progress appropriate to her circumstances. So we will affirm 
the District Court’s judgment in favor of Downingtown. 
